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COMMENT
ROBERT A. GOLDWIN*
I wish to ask only two questions. First, Senator Mathias offers
"ordered liberty" as a "guiding principle for constitutional interpre-
tation."' Is this principle really helpful in interpreting the Constitu-
tion of the United States? Second, if we consider the many proposed
principles or doctrines-whether it be "the original intent of the
founders," orJustice Brennan's constitutional "vision... of human
dignity," 2 or Senator Mathias' "system of ordered liberty"-what
role can any such general principle play as a guide to interpreting
the Constitution?
I will now try to answer those two questions.
Senator Mathias rejects the principle of "the original intent of
the founders" for plausible reasons which need not be repeated.
But he goes on to say, "We cannot reject the theory of 'original
intent' without adopting some other guiding principle for constitu-
tional interpretation .... [W]e must look behind the words of the
Constitution. The answer may be embedded in the underlying prin-
ciples and doctrines of the document."' What he discovers when he
looks "behind the words" is that "[f]or the founders and for us, the
Constitution . . .was and is a system of ordered liberty."4
Let us agree that the Constitution intends to provide a system
of ordered liberty. But does that system provide a useful guiding
principle for constitutional interpretation? I think not. As proud as
we justifiably are of the Constitution of the United States and its
pioneering role in teaching the world the benefits of a written con-
stitution, we surely can acknowledge that ours is not the only system
of ordered liberty. Many other nations, especially the western de-
mocracies, are also political systems of ordered liberty, yet the con-
stitutions of most of those nations share few, if any, of the main
* Resident Scholar and Director of Constitutional Studies, American Enterprise
Institute. B.A., St. John's College, 1950; M.A., University of Chicago, 1954; Ph.D.,
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I. See Mathias, Ordered Liberty: The Original Intent of the Constitution, 47 MD. L. REV.
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2. W. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification 9
(Oct. 12, 1985) (lecture delivered at the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown
University) (available at the .Iadland Law Review).
3. Mathias, supra note 1, at 177-78.
4. Id. at 178.
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structural and institutional features of the Constitution of the
United States.
Great Britain, for example, is a nation also characterized by or-
dered liberty, but very differently constituted. It does not have a
written constitution which is contained in a single document, a fed-
eral structure, judicial review of national legislation, separation of
the executive and legislative branches, executive veto, checks and
balances, calendar elections and fixed terms of office, a written bill
of rights, or a truly bicameral legislature-and these are only a few
of the differences. A similar observation can be made for a dozen or
more other parliamentary democracies that are also systems of or-
dered liberty.
If it is possible to have ordered liberty without major features of
our constitutional system, is it not clear that there is no necessary con-
nection between the principle of "ordered liberty" and our Consti-
tution, however compatible the two may be? In seeking to establish
a system of ordered liberty the authors of the Constitution could
have made many structural and institutional arrangements quite dif-
ferent from the ones upon which they finally agreed. We know that,
committed as they were to the principles of ordered liberty, the au-
thors considered many other very different constitutional features,
and it was not always clear, even to them, why they settled on the
one they did rather than on another.
Because there is no necessary connection between the principle
of ordered liberty and the chief features of our Constitution, there
are many ways of conducting the business of government that will
pass the test of ordered liberty but will not pass the test of constitu-
tionality. For example, the two-year term of office for Representa-
tives5 could just as well have been set as a term of one year, or three,
or even four, but not, consistent with the principles of the Constitu-
tion, as a term of ten or twenty years.
It was not foolish or irrational for the terms of office for Repre-
sentatives, the President, and Senators, to have been set at two,
four, and six years. Nevertheless, those numbers are partly if not
entirely arbitrary and could, consistent with the principle of ordered
liberty, have been set at four, six, and eight years, or even four years
for all. From this example we see that the principle lacks precision.
The only way to understand the constitutional provisions regarding
terms of office, and many other parts of the Constitution, is to read
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, c. 1.
[VOL. 47:189
GOLDWIN: COMMENT ON MATHIAS
the text, not consult some guiding principle for constitutional
interpretation.
The principle of ordered liberty, therefore, would be of no use
in any practical effort to find out what the Constitution requires of
us except in conjunction with a careful scrutiny of the text of the
Constitution itself. In proposing it as a guiding principle for consti-
tutional interpretation, one must be advocating first a careful read-
ing of the text for the purpose of finding its intent, or else the
proposal makes no sense.
I turn now to the second question: What role, if any, can such a
guiding principle for constitutional interpretation play?
There are many reasons usually given for rejecting the principle
of the original intent of the founders. The principle requires dubi-
ous long-distance analysis of the thoughts and motives of members
of a highly diverse group who may have had many differing reasons
for agreeing to the same wording. This and other considerations
make it difficult to use the original intent of the founders as a guide
to the Constitution.
But it is also possible to understand the word "intent" not as
referring to the intent of the founders but to the intent of the consti-
tutional provisions themselves. The legal term "intendment" is de-
fined as "the true meaning, understanding, or intention of a law or
other legal instrument."'6 Senator Mathias uses this meaning when
he speaks of "the intent of the contracting parties."7 It is what most
people mean when they say "intent." The Beatles, for example, in a
contract dispute, accused a recording company of "an unconsciona-
ble distortion of the language and intent of the manufacturing and
distribution agreement."'8 With this use of the word intent, we can
see that it makes a big difference if we speak of "the intent of the
text of the Constitution" instead of "the intent of the founders."
It may sound naive and old-fashioned, and very much against
scholarly trends, but still I would argue that words have meaning
and that the text of the Constitution has a meaning. Any text can be
understood differently by different persons at the same time, or un-
derstood differently generally at different times. That is why the
Supreme Court has many Justices and not just one, why so many
decisions are split decisions, and why earlier decisions are reversed
from time to time. But when two people dispute the meaning of a
6. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1175 (3d ed. unabr. 1976).
7. Mathias, supra note 1, at 187.
8. Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1987, at HI, col. 1.
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text, one saying it means this, the other something else, they still
both assert that the text means something (especially if there are
important interests involved); that it means what they think it means
not because they say so but because they have detected the true
meaning; that its meaning is not arbitrary; and that no one, espe-
cially not a judge, has the right to say "it means what I say it means
because I say so," or any other formulation that indicates that the
text itself is beside the point.
In short, I think the right way to read the Constitution is to
honor the intent of the text, including, of course, the explicit intent
of article V, that the amendments "shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution."-9
Senator Mathias himself, deny it as he will, is an "original intent
of the text" man. According to his argument, time has not changed
the important things. He says that "for the founders and for us"-
equally, I assume-"[the Constitution] was and is,"-that is, now as
much as then-"a system of ordered liberty."' ° The founders were
able "to transcend the moment"" and as the preamble states, "se-
cure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."' 
2
The bulk of Senator Mathias' argument is based on the Consti-
tution's text. Consider his discussion of the Gramni-Rudman-Hol-
lings legislation. He says he has always opposed it; his reasons are
all drawn from the intent of the constitutional text. "Legislative de-
cisions about where to spend, where to cut, and where to tax are for
the Congress to make. . . . "' How does he know? He has consid-
ered the clear intent of the text, of course. He wishes the Supreme
Court had not relied on "the separation of powers principle," not
because he has doubts about the separation of powers but because
the decision could have been grounded more solidly in explicit pro-
visions of the Constitution. "Deficit reduction," Senator Mathias
points out, in true intent-of-the-text style, "is a legislative responsi-
bility that Congress has no power to delegate to anyone else."'14 He
even concludes by musing on "how the founders would have viewed
9. U.S. CONST. art. V.
10. Mathias, supra note 1, at 178. I will skip over the abundant evidence that Senator
Mathias is also an original-intent-of-the-founders man, citing only his repeated refer-
ences to the constitutional debates and his many citations of The Federalist Nos. 5, 10, 47
and 51 to bolster the authority of his interpretations of the Constitution.
i1. Mathias, supra note 1, at 179.
12. U.S. CONST. preamble.
13. Mathias, supra note 1, at 186.
14. Id.
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this dilemma." 15
This version of the principle of intent is one on which Senator
Mathias and I can agree. I think he is at his best as an "intent of the
text" man. It is a good principle because it requires a careful read-
ing of the text as the first step. As Senator Mathias demonstrates,
one must look not only for what the Constitution says but also for
what it does not say. He looks for the power to delegate certain
legislative responsibilities, and seeing none in the text, he is willing
to say that the Supreme Court missed the point and should have
told Congress, very simply, that they cannot exercise a power the
Constitution does not give them. Further, he does not ask whether
this power is in accord with current sentiments. Whether constitu-
tional powers are in accord with present day beliefs about how pow-
ers should be allocated is a question that should be asked only for
the purpose of deciding whether to advocate an amendment to the
Constitution, not for deciding whether the President or the Con-
gress has authority to act.
For example, the two-year term for Representatives is a differ-
ent matter now than it was in 1787. Consider how things have
changed: the costs of campaigning, the size of districts, the nature
of campaigning, and the distance to travel to one's district from
Washington, D.C. Because two years no longer means to a member
of Congress what it used to mean and because time seems to pass so
much faster now, many thoughtful observers conclude that the term
of office for Representatives should be four years, not two. But
should we just legislate the change on the basis that times have
changed and the meaning of two years then really translates to four
years now? Or should we stick to the intent of the provision, the
obvious strict meaning of the text, and insist that if we want to
change the Constitution we should amend it using the procedure
the Constitution provides? The correct answer seems perfectly
clear-use the amending procedure.
How is this example different from the problem Justice Bren-
nan speaks of frequently-capital punishment? The Constitution
has three or four explicit provisions relating to capital punishment,
yet Justice Brennan says that now, unlike then, capital punishment is
"cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth amendment and
violates the fundamental principle of the Constitution-the "vision
of human dignity.""' Does he mean that, therefore, we should
15. Id. at 187.
16. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
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amend the Constitution to eliminate capital punishment? No. He
means that the otherJustices ought to join him andJustice Marshall
in declaring, without resort to the amending procedure, that, be-
cause times have changed, the explicit capital punishment provi-
sions of the Constitution are now invalidated by our newly acquired
awareness that executing murderers violates the "constitutional vi-
sion of human dignity," and that capital punishment is therefore un-
constitutional. This is an example of how a general principle can be
used to alter the clear intent of the text, bypassing the amending
procedure provided by the Constitution.
Unlike Senator Mathias and Justice Brennan, the founders re-
sisted efforts to include in the Constitution statements of principles
such as were found in many state constitutions. Even in drafting the
initial amendments, the members of the First Congress repeatedly
defeated proposals to affix words of principle to the preamble. The
apparent intent was for the Constitution to establish offices and in-
stitutions, assign and limit powers, and remain silent about the prin-
ciples. There are no words in the Constitution about "separation of
powers" or "federalism" or "checks and balances" or even "created
equal" and "unalienable rights," but no able reader of the Constitu-
tion should doubt that they are embedded in the Constitution. We
uncover these principles by reading the text and what it says about
how the government and the people are to be constituted.
The error of those who seek to interpret the Constitution by
principle is that they have the procedural order backwards. We can-
not say what the provisions are by starting with the principle; we
must start with the provisions and derive from them what the princi-
ples are. Only in that way will the Constitution have a sufficiently
steady meaning to provide the kind of guidance that we expect to
derive from it.
Will such a Constitution be able to keep pace with the times?
Of course. The question is not whether the Constitution is to be
timely or not, but rather how the Constitution and new circum-
stances will be reconciled. We must reject the position that the
Constitution is so pliable that it can be shaped and reshaped by the
intellectual and legal fads that come and go. Instead, we should
adopt the position that the Constitution has a steady meaning, a re-
liable and knowable arrangement of institutions, offices, and pow-
("Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong probability
that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total; and
there is no reason to believe that it serves any general purpose more effectively than the
less severe punishment of imprisonment.").
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ers, of such ingenuity and suitability that it provides the necessary
guidance for the future.
We do not want a Constitution that is constantly changing in a
frantic effort to keep up with new circumstances. We want a Consti-
tution that represents principles that are changeless and timeless,
that enable us to make the new circumstances conform to the Con-
stitution. That is the purpose of the Constitution: to enable Ameri-
cans to govern themselves and keep their rights secure in the rapidly
changing unforeseen circumstances of the dangerous world in
which we live.
